Essay (cognitive sciences +)

old notes – The Musical Brain: Novel Study of Jazz Players Shows Common Brain Circuitry Processes Both Music and Language

Researchers scanned brains while musicians “traded fours”.

The brains of jazz musicians engrossed in spontaneous, improvisational musical conversation showed robust activation of brain areas traditionally associated with spoken language and syntax, which are used to interpret the structure of phrases and sentences. But this musical conversation shut down brain areas linked to semantics — those that process the meaning of spoken language, according to results of a study by Johns Hopkins researchers.

The study used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to track the brain activity of jazz musicians in the act of “trading fours,” a process in which musicians participate in spontaneous back and forth instrumental exchanges, usually four bars in duration. The musicians introduce new melodies in response to each other’s musical ideas, elaborating and modifying them over the course of a performance.

This is a picture of Louis Armstrong.

The results of the study suggest that the brain regions that process syntax aren’t limited to spoken language, according to Charles Limb, M.D., an associate professor in the Department of Otolaryngology-Head and Neck Surgery at the Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine. Rather, he says, the brain uses the syntactic areas to process communication in general, whether through language or through music.

Limb, who is himself a musician and holds a faculty appointment at the Peabody Conservatory, says the work sheds important new light on the complex relationship between music and language.

“Until now, studies of how the brain processes auditory communication between two individuals have been done only in the context of spoken language,” says Limb, the senior author of a report on the work that appears online Feb. 19 in the journal PLOS ONE. “But looking at jazz lets us investigate the neurological basis of interactive, musical communication as it occurs outside of spoken language.

“We’ve shown in this study that there is a fundamental difference between how meaning is processed by the brain for music and language. Specifically, it’s syntactic and not semantic processing that is key to this type of musical communication. Meanwhile, conventional notions of semantics may not apply to musical processing by the brain.”

To study the response of the brain to improvisational musical conversation between musicians, the Johns Hopkins researchers recruited 11 men aged 25 to 56 who were highly proficient in jazz piano performance. During each 10-minute session of trading fours, one musician lay on his back inside the MRI machine with a plastic piano keyboard resting on his lap while his legs were elevated with a cushion. A pair of mirrors was placed so the musician could look directly up while in the MRI machine and see the placement of his fingers on the keyboard. The keyboard was specially constructed so it did not have metal parts that would be attracted to the large magnet in the fMRI.

The improvisation between the musicians activated areas of the brain linked to syntactic processing for language, called the inferior frontal gyrus and posterior superior temporal gyrus. In contrast, the musical exchange deactivated brain structures involved in semantic processing, called the angular gyrus and supramarginal gyrus.

“When two jazz musicians seem lost in thought while trading fours, they aren’t simply waiting for their turn to play,” Limb says. “Instead, they are using the syntactic areas of their brain to process what they are hearing so they can respond by playing a new series of notes that hasn’t previously been composed or practiced.”

link- trading fours: 

comment – ..more than Pinker’s auditory cheesecake, music I suppose is at least a stratified, complex dessert or meal transmitting more information more universally (intrinsically) than more abstracted and culturally influenced/derived narrative methods like words. At some point not so far ahead, emerging neuroscience theory will have to include plural and parallel representations in emergent behavior – even though there remains variably influenced hierarchies in the path to expression, – and take into more account the oddness and determination of time, contexts, entropy and the usually counterintuitive sticky aspect of information.

Old Notes: Neural Correlates of Subliminal Language Processing.

Old notes: The Relationship Between Empathy and Reading Fiction:

The Relationship Between Empathy and Reading Fiction: Separate Roles for Cognitive and Affective Components

John Stansfield1,
Louise Bunce2
  1. Independent Researcher, UK
  2. University of Winchester, UK


Research suggests that both life-time experience of reading fiction and the extent to which a reader feels ‘transported’ by the narrative are associated with empathy. This study examined these relationships further by delineating empathy into cognitive and affective components. Thirty-three participants were tested on prior exposure to fiction, transportation, and different measures of cognitive empathy, affective empathy and helping tendency. The results revealed that exposure to fiction was associated with trait cognitive, but not affective, empathy, while the experience of being transported was associated with story-induced affective empathy. Story-induced affective empathy was also associated with helping tendency. The results are discussed by considering implications for relationships between reactions to fictional worlds and reactions to real-world behaviours.

Reading fiction can be a deeply absorbing experience. Readers commonly refer to the experience of being lost in a book (Nell, 1988), or being transported to a different world (Gerrig, 1993). However, relatively little attention has been paid to the mental processes associated with reading fiction, and how they relate to thoughts and behaviours in the real world. The current study examined the relationships among different aspects of fiction reading, i.e. life-time exposure to fictional stories and the immediate experience of being transported by a story, and two components of empathy: cognitive and affective. Cognitive empathy is the ability to understand the world from another person’s point of view and to infer beliefs and intentions, whereas affective empathy refers to the capacity to share another’s feelings and emotions (Blair, 2005).
Much of fiction is concerned with protagonists’ understandings and misunderstandings of the beliefs and motives of other characters and is only comprehensible if the reader is exercising cognitive empathy (Lodge, 2002; Zunshine, 2007). Affective empathy has also been proposed as an essential component of the understanding and enjoyment of fiction (Hogan, 2010). Indeed, Hogan (2010) has argued that literary representations of emotion may be ‘purer’ than those encountered in real-life, and thus have the power to enhance individuals’ affective empathic responses. In addition to the cognitive and affective empathy that is continuously exercised in ‘real-world’ social situations, it has been suggested that a separate component of empathy underlies the tendency to be transported by fictional stories and identify with their characters (Davis, 1980). An interesting question therefore arises as to the relationships between real-world practices of cognitive and affective empathy, and the ability to be transported by reading fiction.
Reading fictional stories has been found to be associated with the development of empathy in children, suggesting that there is an important link between the empathy felt for fictional characters and the ability to empathise with people in reality (Adrian, Clemente, Villaneuva & Rieffe, 2005Aram & Aviram, 2009Mar, Tackett & Moore, 2010). Harris (2000) has suggested that there is continuity between children’s and adults’ engagement with fictional and real worlds. However, relatively few studies have examined the relationship between reading fiction and expressions of real-world empathy in adults.
In two studies by Mar and colleagues, college students were tested on lifetime prior exposure to fictional texts and measures of empathy. Mar, Oatley, Hirsh, dela Paz and Peterson (2006) found that the amount of fiction students had previously read predicted performance on a measure of empathy requiring participants to infer mental states from photographs of people’s eyes (the ‘Reading the Mind in the Eyes’ [RME] test; Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, Raste & Plumb, 2001). The correlational design of this study meant that inferences could not be drawn in relation to the causal link between exposure to fiction and performance on the empathy related task. Thus, it is, as of yet, unclear as to whether fiction-reading was the cause of greater empathic ability, whether people high in empathy are more drawn to read fiction, or whether there was an alternative unidentified variable that explained the association. One alternative explanation, that individual differences in personality were causally related to both exposure to fiction and empathy, was eliminated by Mar, Oatley and Peterson (2009). They found a positive relationship between exposure to fiction and ‘Reading the Mind in the Eyes’ despite controlling for the Big 5 personality variable of ‘openness to experience’.
Mar et al. (2006) did find a measure of social ability that was negatively associated with exposure to fiction: the Interpersonal Perception Task -15 (IPT-15; Costanzo & Archer, 1989). This task measures the ability to decode social relationships represented in video clips using non-verbal cues, and was found by Costanzo and Archer (1989) to be highly correlated with peer ratings of social skills. These results suggest that there may be a more complex relationship between reading fiction and empathy.
One possibility is that reading fiction has a stronger relationship with cognitive empathy, than with affective empathy. According to Lodge (2002), a characteristic of literary fiction is that it is able to provide detailed moment-by-moment descriptions of the inner thoughts and feelings of its protagonists, thereby providing rich opportunities for readers to experience cognitive empathy. In contrast, other fictional forms such as plays and films can offer representations of the external behaviours of their characters, but are less suited to the representation of internal thoughts and feelings. Based on the findings of their research study, Mar and colleagues (2006) suggested that an association between fiction-reading and cognitive empathy might explain why the RME measure positively correlated with exposure to fiction. They argued that the RME test is a measure of cognitive empathy insofar as it relies on matching a verbal descriptor to a depiction of a mental state, but does not necessarily require the participant to share the emotion concerned. The IPT-15, however, is more concerned with decoding embodied emotional cues and might therefore be taken as a measure of affective empathy, thus explaining why it was not associated with prior exposure to fiction. Thus, an aim of the present study was to test the hypothesis that prior exposure to the reading of fiction is positively associated with cognitive empathy abilities but not with affective empathy.
While the Mar et al. studies considered the relationships between prior exposure to fiction and empathy, other studies have examined empathic responses to specific fictional texts. One variable that has been found to affect the relationship between fiction-reading and empathy is termed ‘transportation’ (Johnson, 2012). Using Green and Brock’s (2000) Transportation Index (which measures the extent to which a reader has been absorbed by a story’s characters, plot and imagery) and the Affective Empathy Index (Batson, Early & Salvarani, 1997), Johnson (2012) found a positive relationship between affective empathy and transportation in college students. That is, participants who reported being absorbed in a story also subsequently reported higher levels of emotions that have been associated with affective empathy, such as warmth, compassion and sympathy. Furthermore, there was a positive relationship between the level of affective empathy and performance in a subsequent ‘real-world’ helping task in which participants were presented with an opportunity to help pick up some pens that had been ‘accidentally’ dropped by the researcher. This study was also correlational in design, meaning that no inferences could be drawn about a causal link between transportation and affective empathy. However, immediately prior to reading the story, baseline measures of trait tendencies to be transported by fiction and to feel affective empathy were taken. By controlling for these, Johnson was able to strongly suggest that there may be a direct link between reading-induced experiences of affective empathy and helping behaviour, unaccounted for by an underlying tendency to be easily transported or experience affective empathy.
In addition to this, Bal and Veltkamp (2013) found that participants who were assigned to read a fictional story showed increased levels of affective empathy, but only when highly transported. Participants assigned to read a piece of non-fiction showed no increase in empathy. Both the Johnson (2012) and Bal and Veltkamp (2013) studies found associations between transportation and affective empathy, but did not specifically test for a relationship between transportation and cognitive empathy. Thus, an additional aim of the current study was to test for associations between transportation and both cognitive and affective empathy.
Considering the previous studies, it may be overly simplistic to propose a single relationship between reading fiction and empathy. Individual differences in reading fiction can be examined in relation to how much someone has read over their life-time, and also how transported they have been by a particular story. Furthermore, individual differences in empathy can be assessed in relation to both cognitive and affective empathy. The present study was thus designed to explore individual differences in life-time exposure to reading fiction, transportation, and cognitive and affective empathy. In line with Mar et al. (20062009) it was hypothesised that exposure to fiction would positively relate to cognitive empathy but not necessarily to affective empathy. Conversely, in line with Johnson (2012) and Bal and Veltkamp (2013) it was predicted that transportation by a piece of fiction would relate to levels of affective empathy and subsequent helping tendencies, but not necessarily to exposure to fiction or cognitive empathy.

Method (read the study at the link above)

comment: some semantic differences a bit connected to our language, and my (as a few friends – Susan – are a bit too well aware) borrowing terms but placing them as expressions of and for other models where they assume a different flavor.
Narrative, as I’m using it here, is inexorably tied to present expressed time and is singular. I’m fairly certain (of course it’s a speculation) its expression via language is tied to our inhibitory development (a small chunk up front and left is sort of specialized in that way and one thing that distinguishes our species.) Story – not plot – is by contrast not tied to the present and by its nature, plural, or having time-less alternative meaning, even conflicting. (Ie in the last sentence our language would embed story to fit narrative, so one should grammatically use ‘meanings’ with an s for the sentence narrative even though from the story perspective, its meaning or the meaning it wants to transmit, that would be mistaken.) 

To make it as short: that distinguishing is important, likely I think, to in turn distinguish different expressions of empathy. This study uses existing models of two forms, called cognitive and affective. To me, that’s not enough. Both forms as described would actually utilize primarily affective (narrative) representations (networks of and in) of self in their expression. (Two large ones, brain networks, are broadly defined as default and central executive. The expression of these forms of empathy would in context be more closely tied with the later.) Mirror neurons if they exist (they very likely do) and many of the systems or networks they turbo-charge are at least also connected to emotively context-ed representations that are not so abstracted, that are not directly concerned with affecting. (These many networks are always dialoging, so it’s never an either/or. It emerges either/or only later hierarchically on the way to expression. You do have to eat. And fuck and love and sing and dance depending on motivation and context. Motivation, the necessity to do something, results in one-at-a-time something.)(Heavens, I left out drink.) It’s unlikely that there are very determinate tendential differences locally regarding nearly all modern languages. Mo’s gene’s are mixed like yours or mine or his mothers. Not that there might not be any tendential differences at all. But it’s more the other way around: language can and does affect us and him and her. And that voice they use delineates a slightly different discrete infinity in which embedding occurs, or the way information recursively integrates and is then expressed and received. As you note that voice uses elements of, actually is, poetry-music (for our brains they’re quite similar, overlapped, and different from verbal language per se. And time-less.)

As Paulette Paulette‘s example, story passes through narrative per force but the full impact of story is transmitted not so much by the narrative as by how much story avoids it, transmitting in other ways. Music-poetry reaches in without so much filter. But to engage more (directly those affective networks) and proceed, narrative is necessary, passing through an expressed real time. Fiction is more true than non-fiction in that way (using narrative but transmitting beyond it, accessing or impacting deeper, so to speak, and inherently more empathic networks. And there is a gender-modulated involvement here – recall Beth?) Later or tomorrow more but it’s time to make dinner. Sorry, asparagus ravioli with egg-yolk sauce. La pasta e la pasta.

…a longish after. The workout straightened my heart’s beat but, as often, once that negative-reinforcing turbo kicks in I let the movement run long, all the way into dinner, pausing to walk to the kitchen to put the potatoes on to boil (the puree made after accompanied de-boned quail wrapped around sage and butter and wrapped in turn by prosciutto slices.) There’s a difference between affective representations – abstracted things, identifying what an abstracted you can do with them and how – and integrated representations – what they mean or how they are connected without you doing anything. That’s why the terminology used in this study and elsewhere – affective vs cognitive empathy – can be a bit confounding. It mixes words sloppily, I think. 
   Affective empathy likely works relatively more on/with integrated representations with emotionally gated contexts. It affects a representation of you that isn’t so, in turn, affective. It’s effect is more bottom-up. It’s the butter within the quail integrating with the meat to make it moist. Not that cognitive empathy is so abstracted – it still involves embodiment, and it’s always a dialog in context. But it speaks relatively more to a you that is more abstracted, less emotionally or at least differently emotionally gated. It’s stuff you can in turn do stuff with, understand in a manipulative way as much as feel, stuff without as, or not transmitting so, many possibilities. The prosciutto on the outside whose fat will melt into the pan in which you can turn – optional -the quails. Part of your affecting to its context.

Taste. Flavor. We smell and taste…and feel, hear, see, etc. That input arrives, for the most part, into our awareness only after a lot of integration has already occurred. So flavor is very much formed as much as what we are, by the receiver, as itself. Of course, though for some reason many had been and some are still trying to reduce input into ‘qualia’, (not quails, which are, ah, real – before you put them in your mouth and after.) An excess of Sp2 receptors is sort of a condemnation. Likely deriving for the obvious survival benefits, (bitterness. I suppose, as in theorize, that a relative high concentration in your mouth often if not usually corresponds to high concentrations below. When your guts taste bitterness, they transmit a signal to, well, flush by adding water, getting rid of the potentially harmful bitter stuff by getting it out quicker and avoiding at least some intestinal absorption,) they and others also talk to your brain and mind bottom-up, influencing in a stratified way, directly and indirectly. But you’re not aware of it.

Where was I? Flavor. Stuff. Meaning. Has to a relative aspect, a relation. Bottom-up will tend to create meaning that is less related to any affective you. Not the one that meanders, daydreams. 
   Take the opposite extreme, in a sense, of someone autistic. Someone who has no or relatively little filter from integrated stuff into what that affective person is supposed to do with it. No inhibition, in that way. Always in the present, rather the expression. No alternatives allowed, breakfast cereal – only that kind, only that milk, only at that hour, then we do that activity – only that activity, only in that order. You’d expect a part of their brain, that part that deals with affecting, to be relatively muscular, and a smaller part that deals with integration, with maintaining relations and alternative meanings outside of time. And they do, even on a neuronal basis. (The study just out, if you take the time to read the results, actually confirms larger ventricular -assume right 4th- and specific wall thickening, moreover it doesn’t distinguish age groups -development here is key – severity of symptoms, even excludes severe head movement (image resolution. Worse obviously in severe patients,) includes asberger’s – for me that shouldn’t be included – ecc.) Anyway, to taste receptors, a little bit.Genes are an odd thing. Rather, the difference between the way we usually model them, vs their function. Even Darwin, and the sort of lacking in Origin Of Species which, a bit implicitly, already begins to be addressed in Descent Of Man – actually perhaps a more important book. They don’t give a crap about us, our genes. We’re merely part of a side-effect, useful expressions, transporting information of much larger integrated systems through time or into this present eternal. Part of a slow dialog between those systems and their context(s). The world, which would be our world….Representations.
   Ie: I’m not a fully aware synesthesiac. Still, many things have a sort of flavor to me – but a bit farther up. That is, integrated material delivers a taste, has a taste – only of different kinds of bitterness and harmony, is the only way I can describe it, not flavor as such. But when an integrated model moves easily, correctly, it is accompanied by an harmonious, pleasant bitterness. If it has a tasted sweetness it’s no good, something is wrong with the model. There’s a contrast that still has to be resolved. Note, I’m an odd bloke effectively, so that flavor in me is mixed into something that isn’t affective, a sort of thing that usually most people aren’t at all aware of. And given consistency and history, I likely have an excess of Sp2 receptors from my palate on down. And this is staying away from even more obvious stuff like serotinin levels.

The idea is that those enteric (gut) neurons play a role both in representing the world and our selves to our selves before abstraction, relatively, and communicate with a system that is very large, i.e. that likely includes stuff like all that bacteria we carry – which are probably more determinate genetically in the system than we, abstracted, are. Certainly larger than our selves alone. Anyway. Full stomachs. Irregular heart beats. Interaction of systems. Different representations of self. Different contexts. Different expressions of time. And quails.

old notes: articles-language


Language is a high-level cognitive function, so exploring the neural correlates of unconscious language processing is essential for understanding the limits of unconscious processing in general. The results of several functional magnetic resonance imaging studies have suggested that unconscious lexical and semantic processing is confined to the posterior temporal lobe, without involvement of the frontal lobe-the regions that are indispensable for conscious language processing. However, previous studies employed a similarly designed masked priming paradigm with briefly presented single and contextually unrelated words. It is thus possible, that the stimulation level was insufficiently strong to be detected in the high-level frontal regions. Here, in a high-resolution fMRI and multivariate pattern analysis study we explored the neural correlates of subliminal language processing using a novel paradigm, where written meaningful sentences were suppressed from awareness for extended duration using continuous flash suppression. We found that subjectively and objectively invisible meaningful sentences and unpronounceable nonwords could be discriminated not only in the left posterior superior temporal sulcus (STS), but critically, also in the left middle frontal gyrus. We conclude that frontal lobes play a role in unconscious language processing and that activation of the frontal lobes per se might not be sufficient for achieving conscious awareness.

comment: …until, I think, expressed inferences of self (descriptions of ‘us’, or subjects, or consciousness) remain delineated within notions of singular narratives… well, that… doesn’t fit the, by now oceans of, data. And as important, I think again… confounding language (temporal representation) with communication and systems that create and express through language (evolved, evolving and entropic, expressed in the present,)  …we’ll still have a lot of… evident misunderstanding. In any and every moment there are so many languages, but only one expression. Or, by now it seems fairly clear, to move forward, models should move not merely away from though include modularity, connectome, network, ecc but toward as yet unknown but predictable specificity, uncertainty and dialoguing systems leading hierarchically and through inhibition to expression. Harder by far, likely, on almost every strata but…probably unavoidable, and sort of wonderful – to be only near the beginning of a beginning




Old notes on Chalmers and consciousness

It seems Chalmers does what was a fairly consistent conceptual slide, (at least as seen from outside.) That is, after taking consciousness as a subject, then – in this casual interview anyway – he goes straight to mixing it up with the external expression of mostly extrinsic self, almost implying a singular notion of both consciousness and perception (awareness). Ie, he as an organism might perceive a shade of a color intrinsically but, not having the categorization for it, not be aware of having perceived it and not express it. Yet if primed he will nevertheless exhibit behavior that implies he did perceive the variance. He uses a color-blind example in the video – she can’t have a conscious experience of color – but what then is it he is aware of experiencing? (A categorically influenced self-referring experience, of course, that categorization of which he is not fully aware.) Let alone basic survival circuits and contextual influence. Just because a system can’t express itself does not mean it can’t identify and be aware of itself. 

video – Chalmers on consciousness:

If instead you consider consciousness stratified, interacting and plural, then its evolution and emergence are pretty direct. The more, maybe singularly, human form of transiently more self abstraction from context is only one kind, even for us. We fabulate narratives. If one insists on defining and limiting consciousness as our kind, then you introduce a boatload of other problems. Which he seems to sort of do, in which consciousness becomes almost relative and entirely subjective. Which would bring you back to the beginning: since you can’t be absolutely sure that anything else is conscious but can be absolutely sure that you are, how can you absolutely define anything else as not being so? Or, if some expression of self-awareness is a requirement, then you must have at least something else to identify it, which would imply that consciousness exits only within a larger system, which would in turn need a larger system to be identified, and on and on in an infinite regression.

The problem of defining consciousness and then observing it then remain a bit difficult, it seems. Ie, a personal example, at 16/17 in my last year of high school I learned to both dream in series and control myself in those dreams, I presume others may have done similarly. Though not every night… for a period of weeks I kept trying to maintain my consciousness or awareness or call it what you will within sleep even after bringing myself to wakefulness, which of course never worked. But being aware of experiencing, and bringing myself up from the identified dreaming state were easy things, then. In a Chalmer’s or similar definition, despite being asleep I was actually experiencing a self within an environment  (though I presume a nearly completely internal one, still within that state was quite conscious of my experience and could and did interact with it.) 

Not much later, again like others, I suppose, affective inhibition from developing, more extrinsic left, dorsolateral and pfc networks pretty much ended that sort of fun. What seems dissuading is the notion that any system that is both self-monitoring and determinately interacting might be called conscious between input (less related to real and present/future time) and output. That is, it seems like many within those fields as Chalmer’s prefer to emphasize self-abstraction in any definition of consciousness, something which seems intuitively resultant more from inhibition, or negative, rather than positive, network interactions. Which is sort of fine but why not qualify, effectively limit, the word or concept and make it both clearer and easier? And distinguish it more from awareness.

 A ‘set-consciousness’ <‘set-all’ described is sort of what I’m getting at, (a negative, choosing a smaller set by inhibition.) An empirical or any definition of consciousness then might include that quality, and even extend it at least to interacting self-awareness (‘set- self awareness'< ‘set-self-unexpressed’, necessary self-abstraction.) Agreeably, awareness descriptively doesn’t necessarily need any kind of self awareness even if you include some form that doesn’t imply consciousness. And as well – the problem seems in part awfully human – as that last bit remains disquieting, though for good reason. (Religion stuff seems more an inevitable form of consequence when ‘set-self-aware'<‘set-self-unexpressed'<‘set self-all’.)

Which would lead to systems….


old notes – language: the “verb second constraint” could explain how people acquire language

….”Never in the field of human conflict was so much owed by so many to so few,” could hold the key to understanding how humans acquire language from birth.
The sentence features a remnant of something called the “verb second” constraint; a linguistic construction which appears in most Germanic languages, but has disappeared from Romance (Latin-based) grammars, such as Spanish or French.
In simple terms, verb second, or “V2” languages are, as the name suggests, defined by the fact that the verb tends to take second place in a sentence. Understanding why the principle was abandoned by one language family, but retained by the other, is the central objective of a new project that is being carried out by an international team of language scientists from the Universities of Cambridge and Oslo, among others.
The researchers believe that the verb second constraint could be used to test Noam Chomsky’s famous, but contested, idea of universal grammar. The theory, developed in the 1950s, argues that humans acquire language because we possess an innate, hard-wired ability to do so.
Sam Wolfe, from the Department of Theoretical and Applied Linguistics and St John’s College, University of Cambridge, said: “If we want to know whether or not universal grammar exists, we need to model what is actually going on inside our heads when we learn a language, so that we can better understand the toolbox we all make use of. The question is, how do you do that? One solution is to study language properties that might give us a clue, and the verb second constraint seems to be one of the best examples available – a lens to test that theory.”….

Read more at:

comment: …er, the notion of universal grammar would have more to do with body, inferences of self, non-self and space. As this subject. As ‘I’ or affective representations of self bulked up and are fostered in some places, the V2 per force diminished and diminishes. More… perhaps communication and language really aren’t so directly intertwined. A language speaks to itself. Every moment has many languages, temporally represented whereas the systems from which languages emerge evolve entropically, constantly. Communication would then be an expression from and using the same, in the present eternal.